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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Grace Helen Davie, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for tampering with a witnesss, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (West 2004), and assault, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4403(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should this Court address Defendant's unpreserved and inadequately 
briefed claim that the witness-tampering statute is unconstitutionally vague? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
2. Did the evidence suffice to support the trial court's verdict? 
Standard of Review. "In assessing a claim that there was insufficient evidence 
to support a trial court's verdict/' an appellate court sustains "the trial court's 
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence," or unless the court 
"reachjes] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made/7 State v. 
Briggs, 2008 UT 83, f 11, 199 P.3d 935 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
3. Should this Court address Defendant's unpreserved, inadequately briefed, 
and moot claim ihat the trial court abused its discretion by imposing cruel and 
unusual punishment when it suspended Defendant's prison term, imposed a 30-day 
jail sentence to be served in five-day increments, and ordered that Defendant use 
her medications in jail only under controlled conditions? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) (assault); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (West 2004) (witness tampering). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with two counts of tampering with a witness 
and one count of assault. Rl-2. Defendant waived her right to a jury, and the court 
found her guilty of assault and one count of witness tampering. R70-71,77-79. The 
court found her not guilty on the second witness tampering count. R78. The court 
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term, not to exceed five years, for 
her witness-tampering conviction. R116. The court suspended the prison term, 
ordered 36-months' probation, and imposed a 30-day jail term, to be served in five-
2 
day increments.1 R116-17, 149-52. On her assault conviction, the trial court 
sentenced her to a 365-day jail term, but suspended all 365 days. R117, 149-52. 
Among the conditions of her probation, the court required Defendant to maintain a 
patient relationship with one physician, to have her prescriptions filled at one 
pharmacy, and to report all prescriptions to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) 
within 24 hours of receipt. R118,149-52. Defendant timely appealed. R139.2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Grace Davie, is the mother of Jeremiah McFall. R145:8. Her son, 
Jeremiah, and daughter-in-law, Jennifer, were married March 31, 2008. R145:110. 
Soon after the marriage, Jeremiah and Jennifer moved to Milf ord where they lived 
briefly with Jeremiah's sister. R145:110-ll. By July they were renting a room in a 
home owned by Chuck and Jen Larsen. R145:10-ll, 111. They later moved into a 
trailer on Defendant's property and were living there in October 2008. R145:lll-12. 
1
 The court imposed a 120-day jail term, then suspended 90 days of that term, 
and ordered that Defendant serve 30 days in jail. R116-17,149-52. 
2
 The trial court pronounced sentence on January 27,2010, but did not sign or 
file the judgment. R116-18. Defendant filed his notice of appeal on February 24, 
2010. R139. On March 24, 2010, the trial court filed a signed judgment. R149-52. 
The appeal is nevertheless timely. See City of St George v. Smith, 814 P.2d 1154,1155-
56 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that notice of appeal filed after verdict, but before 
sentencing, was timely), overruled on other grounds by City of St. George v. Smith, 828 
P.2d 504,505 (Utah App. 1992). 
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The July witness tampering: Jennifer ''needed to be imaginative" 
On Sunday, July 6, 2008, Jeremiah and Jennifer had an argument. R145:10. 
While outside on the sidewalk in front of the Larsen home, Jeremiah attempted to 
take the car keys from Jennifer, grabbing her wrists and waist. Id. Jeremiah then 
tried to pick Jennifer up and carry her into the house. R145:ll. In the process, they 
both fell to the ground. Id. Jeremiah then sat on Jennifer's stomach and pinned her 
arms down with his legs. Id. Finally, he pushed up off her, pressing down on her 
chest. Id. Jennifer, crying and upset, started walking down the street. Id. She then 
noticed two people who had been standing on the corner. R145:ll-12. 
Jennifer asked the woman standing there to call the police. R145:12. The 
woman, who later testified at trial, said that the police were already on their way. 
R145:12,37-42. She asked Jennifer to stay outside and in sight so that she could be 
sure that "nothing else would happen to [Jennifer]." Id. 
Police arrived and asked Jennifer a few questions. Id. They then found 
Jeremiah, handcuffed him, and took him to jail. Id. Jennifer told Officer Vincent 
Cox what had happened. Id.; see also R145:56. 
Jennifer went home and called Defendant to tell her that Jeremiah had been 
taken to jail. R145:12. Defendant said she would call back. Id. Vvhen Defendant 
called back, she told Jennifer that Jeremiah had taken parts out of their truck so that 
it would not start. Id. Defendant said that she was going to Beaver the next day to 
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get the parts from him. Id. She asked Jennifer if she wanted to go with her "and talk 
to [Jeremiah's] probation officer and let him know what was going on, and get the 
parts." Id. Jennifer said that would be fine. R145:13. Defendant called Jennifer 
several times after that to ask whether she was sure about what had happened and 
if she "was sure that [she] felt Jeremiah was being abusive." Id. 
The next day Defendant drove Jennifer from Milford to Beaver. Id. She asked 
again whether Jennifer was sure that Jeremiah was abusing her. R145:15. She told 
Jennifer that "due to [Jeremiah's] previous problems with the law, that something 
like this could cause him to go to prison; and if he were to go to prison, that he 
would kill himself." Id. 
Defendant then asked Jennifer if she "knew what recanting [her] statement 
was." Id. Defendant explained that "it's where [Jennifer] could go back and tell 
them—tell the officer that [she] wasn't clear on [her] statement; that [she] was 
confused or upset or emotional, and [she] didn't give them all the facts." Id. 
Defendant said that Jennifer "had a chance to keep Jeremiah out of prison, if [she] 
would." Id. When Jennifer asked what that meant, Defendant told her that she 
"need[ed] to be imaginative." Id. 
Defendant continued, "Well, isn't it true that you cut yourself in the past?" 
R145:15-16. Jennifer agreed that it was true. R145:16. Defendant then said, "Well, 
hypothetically, what if you were trying to cut yourself, and Jeremiah was trying to 
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get a knife away from you?" Id. Jennifer said that she was not trying to cut herself 
and had not done so in a long time. Id. Defendant then said, "But hypothetically, 
could Qeremiah] have been trying to get a knife away from you, you know, if that 
would keep him from going to prison, do you think you would be able to go and tell 
them that you were confused on your statement; that you were upset and 
emotional, and you were embarrassed to let them know that you cut yourself and 
that he was just trying to protect you from yourself?" Id. 
Jennifer asked Defendant whether she could get in trouble for that. Id. 
Defendant said, "Recanting your statement can't get you in trouble." Id. Jennifer 
then said that she did not "even know who [she] would talk to." Id. Defendant told 
Jennifer "to go in and talk to [Jeremiah's] probation officer." Id. 
Defendant also told Jennifer that Defendant "had been in trouble for witness 
tampering before, and that if anybody asked [Jennifer] why [she] wanted to change 
[her] statement, that [she] should tell them that it was because [she] felt bad for 
getting Jeremiah in trouble when he shouldn't have been in trouble." R145:±7. 
Defendant said "[t]hat if anybody thought that [Defendant] had anything to do with 
it, . . . [Jennifer] was to say that. . . she came to [Defendant] with questions and 
[Defendant] just answered [her] questions with the best of her knowledge. That 
[Defendant] was not telling [Jennifer] to do this." Id. 
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So when they got to Beaver, Jennifer went in and spoke with Jeremiah's 
probation officer. R145:16. She told the probation officer, "I was really upset and 
confused," "I was trying to cut myself," and "Jeremiah was trying to take a weapon 
away from me so that I wouldn't hurt myself." R145:16-17. The probation officer 
told Jennifer that she should go back and give her statement to the officer to whom 
she had spoken the day before. Id. 
On the way back to Milford, Jennifer told Defendant that she "didn't even 
have any marks on [her] . . . because [she] hadn't cut [herself] in so long. 
[Defendant] said, again, that [Jennifer] needed to be imaginative. That... Jeremiah 
would kill himself if he went to prison; and if [Jennifer] loved him [she] wouldn't let 
something like this happen to him." R145:18. So "when [Jennifer] got back to 
Chuck and Jen's house, before [she] called dispatch,... [she] cut [herself] on [her] 
leg. . . so that [she] would have proof that Jeremiah was trying to protect [her] from 
[herself]." R145:19. She then called dispatch. Id. 
When she met with Officer Cox, she began telling him the story about 
Jeremiah's "trying to take a knife out of [her] hand." Id. She showed Officer Cox 
the cut on her leg. Id. The officer noted that he had not seen any of those marks on 
her leg the day before. Id. He told Jennifer that she was supposed to tell the truth 
and explained that she could be charged for giving a false statement. R145:20 
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Jennifer broke down and "ended up telling the officer that [Defendant] had 
asked [her] to lie for Jeremiah." Id. Defendant had "hinted" that Jennifer should lie 
"so that [Jeremiah] wouldn't go to prison, so that he wouldn't kill himself." Id. At 
that point the officer asked Jennifer if she "wanted to stick with [her] original 
statement." Id. Jennifer said that she did and that she was sorry that she had "tried 
to come and lie to him and that [she] had lied to th[e] probation officer." Id. 
Tlte October assault: punching, hitting, and kicking Jennifer and 
"feeling her up" to see if she had the money on her 
Jeremiah and Jennifer got back together after the July fight and moved into a 
trailer on Defendant's property. R145:62. On the evening of October 25, 2008, 
Jeremiah had some friends over, and Jennifer, who was feeling ill, went to lie down. 
R145:63-64. At about 2:00 a.m., Jennifer heard Jeremiah telling a girl who was 
visiting that "he was not happy being married." RMS:64. Jennifer was upset. 
R145:65. She left her room to use the bathroom and, seeing Jeremiah, "glared at 
him." R145:65. He became angry, got in the car, and drove away with the girl. Id. 
Jennifer borrowed Defendant's car, drove to town to buy cigarettes, and called 
Jeremiah. Id. Jeremiah told her that he wanted her to get her stuff and leave. Id. So 
Jennifer went to an ATM and "drew out $260 that was in the bank account." Id. She 
felt justified because she had put about $300 in the account and Jeremiah had put in 
about $280. R145:66-67. They had used the $300 to make a down payment on a car 
in both their names and to buy a cell phone. Id. 
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Shortly after their conversation, Jeremiah also went to the ATM and found the 
money had been withdrawn. R145:66. When he returned home, the guests had all 
left. Id. He was angry and "adamant about [the $260] being his money/' Id. 
Jennifer told him that "[h]e could have the money, or he could have the car and the 
cell phone." Id. But Jeremiah wanted to know where his money was. Id. He 
slammed Jennifer into the bedroom door and said, "You're stealing from me. Give 
me my money." Id. 
When Jennifer would not give him the money, Jeremiah once more began 
"slamming [her] into the bedroom door. He slammed so hard that he broke the 
door." R145:67. At that point Jennifer fell down, and he was on top of her, saying 
"he wanted his wedding rings back" and would break her finger or cut it off to get 
them. R145:68. He repeatedly slammed her head "into the coffee table and the door 
that were underneath [her] that [she] had fallen into when he broke the door." Id. 
At some point Defendant came in. Defendant joined the fray, called Jennifer 
"a bunch of vulgar names," and punched Jennifer in the eye. Id. Jeremiah went into 
the bedroom to search for Jennifer's purse. R145:69. Jennifer tried to walk out the 
front door, but Defendant grabbed her by the hair, pulled her back, and caused her 
to fall onto the floor and re-injure her back. Id. Defendant "kicked [Jennifer] several 
times," "hit [her] in the face several times," and "tried feeling [Jennifer] up a couple 
of times to see if [she] had the money on [her]." Id. 
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Jeremiah then came back and pulled Defendant off Jennifer. Id. Then, for 
about 30 to 45 minutes, Defendant and Jeremiah took turns hitting, kicking, and 
choking Jennifer and pulling her hair. Id. 
Defendant finally went back inside her house. Jennifer did not remember 
what for. Jennifer remembered "begging Jeremiah to stop, to not let his mom touch 
[her] anymore, to let [her] leave. [Jennifer] didn't want anything." Id. Jennifer told 
Jeremiah that she would give him the money "if he just let [her] be, let [her] walk 
out of there." Id. When Defendant returned, Jeremiah told Jennifer to call her 
parents. Id. Jennifer did so and asked them to pick her up. Id. 
When her parents picked her up at the local Chevron station, Jennifer had a 
black eye, some hair ripped out, a swollen lip, bruises on her arms, and a sore head, 
neck, and legs. R145:71. Her back was so badly injured that she had difficulty 
getting out of bed for two weeks, and her parents had to help her go to the 
bathroom and shower. Id. 
10 
Jeremiah's story 
In an interview with police officers, Jeremiah told police that during the 
October incident Defendant had beaten Jennifer and that he had repeatedly pulled 
Defendant off Jennifer. See State's Exhibit 7, p. 2-3. He also told the police that 
Defendant told him to say that he was not there. Id. 
At trial, Jeremiah testified that he and Jennifer had argued over the phone. 
R145:15. He said that he had checked the bank account and found that the money 
was all gone. Id. So he went home, and Jennifer told him that she wanted to leave 
and that she had all the money. Id. He testified that he said, " All right/' and told 
Jennifer to contact her parents and have them come and get her. He then helped her 
pack and took her to a gas station and dropped her off. R145:116,121. Jennifer then 
gave him half the money she had withdrawn from the bank. Id. 
Jeremiah testified that Jennifer called the next day to say that she had made a 
statement to police about getting into a fight with Defendant and that he "needed to 
back her up on this." Rl45:118. So Jeremiah told ''the police exactly the same story" 
that Jennifer told him. Id. But, he testified, Jennifer was, in fact, "just fine/7 
3
 The record includes Jeremiah's statements and testimony about the October 
assault. It does not contain any statement or testimony from Jeremiah regarding the 
July assault or the July witness tampering. 
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R145:119. She had no injuries other than "cutting herself, self-inflicted wounds." Id. 
When asked about Jennifer's "battered" face shown in State's Exhibit 4, he said it 
"[l]ook[ed] like a lot of smeared makeup." R145:120. Asked about her "fat lip," he 
said it looked "like a cold sore." Id. Asked about a bruise on her hand, he said it 
could be a "skin blotch." Id. Asked about the bruising on her back shown in State's 
Exhibit 2, he said it looked "like there's a big old wet mark." Id. He continued to 
assert that Jennifer was "just fine" when he dropped her off and that his original 
statement to police was "made up." R145:121. 
Defendant's story 
Defendant testified that after the July incident, Jennifer called her to tell her 
that Jeremiah had been taken to jail. R145:159. Later that evening, Jennifer called to 
ask Defendant if she was going to Beaver and, if so, whether Jennifer could go with 
her. Id. 
Defendant testified that as they drove over, Jennifer was very quiet. R145:160. 
Defendant said Jennifer asked, "What if Jeremiah was trying to take something 
away from me?" Id. Jennifer pulled a razor blade out of her purse and said that she 
was trying to cut herself. Id. Jennifer said that she did that when she got depressed. 
Id. Defendant said that she told Jennifer "that if that was the case, then [Jennifer] 
needed to tell his probation officer and tell the jail what actually happened." 
R145:161. Defendant said that she did not give Jennifer "a story, hypothetically 
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speaking," did not "tell her to be imaginative," did not "tell her that she could 
recant her statement," and did not "threaten her in any way about recanting her 
statement." R145:161-62. 
Regarding the October incident, Defendant said that she did not punch, grab 
or kick Jennifer, bruise her back, or pull her hair. R145:165-66. Rather, Defendant 
testified, she would "bet money" that Jennifer and Jeremiah were fighting again. 
R145:166. Defendant said that Jeremiah was very violent and had recently broken 
Defendant's nose and eye socket. Id. 
Defendant nonetheless testified, she "never did see Jeremiah that night." 
R145:165. She would "bet money" that Jeremiah and Jennifer had been "fighting 
again and come to blows," but she wasn't there and she "didn't do it." R145:166-67. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that the witness-tampering statute is impermissibly vague 
is unpreserved and inadequately briefed. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has 
already held that the witness-tampering statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The 
statute provides people of ordinary intelligence notice of what it prohibits. It does 
not authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
The evidence sufficed to support the trial court's verdict. A trial court, acting 
as trier-of-fact, is entitled to determine what witnesses and what parts of their 
testimony are credible. The evidence here, as credited by the trial court, more than 
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sufficed to support guilty verdicts on both counts. Defendant's claim that the trial 
court was required to eliminate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is 
incorrect. The existence of one or more reasonable alternative hypotheses does not 
necessarily prevent the trier-of-fact from concluding that a defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because it is the exclusive province of the trier-
of-fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh competing theories, and 
then conclude which one he will believe. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing is 
unpreserved, inadequately briefed, and moot. Moreover, the trial court did not 
impose cruel and unusual punishment, order an inherently unfair sentence, or 
otherwise abuse its discretion when it suspended Defendant's prison term, imposed 
a 30-day jail term, and required that Defendant receive her medication in jail under 




DEFENDANT'S VAGUENESS CLAIM IS UNPRESERVED, 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED, AND MERITLESS 
Utah law provides that a person is guilty of tampering with a witness "if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, . . . [she] attempts to induce or otherwise cause another person to . . . 
testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony, information, document, or 
item." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508. Defendant asserts that this statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. See Br. Appellant at 21-23. 
A. This claim is unpreserved. 
Defendant's vagueness claim is unpreserved. "As a general rule, appellate 
courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the 
first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,359 (Utah App. 1993). "In 
order to preserve an issue for appeal, it 'must be raised in a timely fashion, must be 
specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness 
before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal 
authority.'" State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, | 8, 86 P.3d 759 (quoting State v, 
Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, % 19, 58 P.3d 879 (quotations and citations omitted)). 
"The trial court is considered 'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful 
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and probing analysis' of issues." Brown, 856 P.2d at 360 (citation omitted). The 
preservation rule allows "the trial court an opportunity to 'address the claimed 
error, and if appropriate, correct it.'" State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,110,46 P.3d 230 
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346). 
Although required by the appellate rules, Defendant has not provided 
"citation to the record showing that the [constitutional vagueness] issue was 
preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(1)(5). Moreover, the State has not 
located any place in the record where Defendant argued that the witness-tampering 
statute was unconstitutionally vague. Thus, the issue is unpreserved. 
On appeal, Defendant has not argued that any exception to the preservation 
rule applies. She has not argued that the issue should be reviewed for plain error or 
under any other exception to the preservation rule. Thus, this Court should not 
review this issue. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111; State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, If 14,128 
P.3d 1171 (appellate court does not review unpreserved claim unless party 
"articulate[s] an appropriate justification"). 
B. This claim is inadequately briefed. 
This Court should also decline to address this issue because it is inadequately 
briefed. Defendant devotes fewer than three pages of her brief to a cursory claim 
that the witness-tampering statute is vague. See Br. Appellant at 21-23. Defendant 
asserts that the word "induce" is not adequately defined and that the word 
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"attempts" is unclear. Br. Appellant at 22-23. Finally, without further explanation, 
Defendant asserts that the "statutory language without restriction in terms of 
defining inducement leaves too broad a scope for enforcement to be arbitrarily 
applied by local agencies." Br. Appellant at 23. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires a defendant's brief 
to "contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled to have 
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, % 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, % 67, 57 P.3d 977 
(rejecting inadequately briefed claim in death penalty case); State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, \ 46 n.5, 37 P.3d 1073. "Implicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the 
reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 
69 P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the 
court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, % 12, 52 
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P.3d 467. This Court simply "will not engage in constructing arguments "out of 
whole cloth' on behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,72 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990) (citation omitted). In fact, "Utah courts routinely decline to consider 
inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998); 
see also State v. Norris, 2001UT104, f 28,48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, 
f 13,72 P.3d 138. 
Here, Defendant has not cited, much less tried to distinguish, the Utah 
precedent that has already held that the witness-tampering statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1981). 
Moreover, Defendant apparently claims that the statute is vague because a person 
might be convicted of witness tampering for using "subtle means of persuasion or 
encouragement." See Br. Appellant at 21. But she has cited no authority suggesting 
that a statute criminalizing the intentional use of subtle means to persuade or 
encourage a person to inform or testify falsely is unconstitutionally vague. Thus, 
Defendant has not cited to "pertinent authority" nor provided any meaningful 
analysis, and her claim is inadequately briefed. 
C This claim lacks merit 
Even if this Court were to excuse Defendant's twin failures, her vagueness 
claim is meritless. As explained, the Utah Supreme Court has already held that the 
statute is not impermissibly vague. See Carlsen, 638 P.2d at 515. Moreover, the claim 
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fails under the analysis set forth by both United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court. As explained below, because the witness-tampering statute does 
not implicate a First Amendment right, Defendant may challenge the statute only as 
applied to her conduct. The witness-tampering statute is not vague as applied to 
Defendant, because a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that a 
person who attempts to persuade her daughter-in-law to recant her true story to 
police about an assault and substitute for it a false account would violate the statute. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has already rejected a claim that 
the witness-tampering statute is vague. 
As explained in Point IB, above, the Utah Supreme Court has already upheld 
the witness tampering statute against a claim that the statute was impermissible 
vague. See id. In Carlsen, the court held that the statute "states unambiguously that 
a person who 'attempts to induce or otherwise cause another person to . . . absent 
himself from any proceeding . . . to which he has been summoned' is guilty of a 
third degree felony." Thus, in addressing another sub-part of the statute, the court 
has concluded that the language "attempts to induce" is not ambiguous or 
unconstitutionally vague. In so doing, the court has already rejected Defendant's 
claim that the terms are "not adequately defined" and therefore vague. See Br. 
Appellant at 22-23. 
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2. Defendant may not complain of vagueness of a law as 
applied to the hypothetical conduct of others. 
The vagueness doctrine 'is an outgrowth... of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment/' United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,304 (2008). A conviction 
violates due process "if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless 
that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement." Id.; see also 
State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 43, 99 P.3d 820. A statute need not define an offense 
with "mathematical certainty," however. Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked by 'flexibility and reasonable breadth, 
rather than meticulous specificity/" as long as "it is clear what the ordinance as a 
whole prohibits." Id. (citation omitted). 
A "court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge 'only if the [statute] is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications/" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, Tf 12, 
84 P.3d 1171 (emphasis added). Thus, ordinarily, a defendant "who engages in 
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness in the law 
as applied to the conduct of others." Williams, 553 U.S. at 304. That requirement, 
however, has been "relaxed . . . in the First Amendment context, permitting 
plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad because it is unclear whether it 
regulates a substantial amount of protected speech." Id. Consequently, vagueness 
challenges "'which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in 
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light of the facts of the case at hand/" Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 44 (quoting Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,495 n.7 (1982)). 
Defendant does not claim that any vagueness in the witness-tampering statute 
implicates a First Amendment right. Br. Appellant at 21-23. Therefore, she may not 
challenge the statute as overbroad or as facially invalid. She may challenge the 
statute as vague only as applied to herself. 
3. Because Defendant had actual notice that her conduct was 
prohibited, she cannot show that the statute was vague as 
applied to herself. 
Jennifer testified at trial that Defendant suggested that Jennifer recant her 
story to police about the July assault, tell police that she was attempting to cut 
herself, and say that Jeremiah was trying to protect her from cutting herself. See 
R145:15-17. Defendant also told Jennifer that Defendant had been in trouble for 
witness tampering before and that if anybody thought that that Defendant had 
anything to do with Jennifer's changing her story, Jennifer should deny it. See id. 
The trial court credited Jennifer's testimony when it found Defendant guilty of 
witness tampering. See R78-79. In crediting Jennifer's testimony, the trial court also 
found that Defendant had actual notice that her conduct violated the witness-
tampering statute. Defendant therefore cannot show that the statute was vague as 
to herself. 
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4. The witness-tampering statute is not vague as to the 
conduct for which Defendant was convicted. 
But even absent the testimony showing actual notice, Defendant could not 
show that the witness-tampering statute was vague as to her conduct. To prevail on 
a vague-as-applied challenge, Defendant must show "either (1) that the statute]] 
do[es] not provide 'the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand 
what conduct [is prohibited]/ or (2) that the statute[] 'encourage[s] arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement/" MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 13 (citations omitted). In 
other words, the question is whether the statute gave notice that Defendant's actions 
would violate the law. 
It did. Defendant (1) told her daughter-in-law, Jennifer, that the assault report 
Jennifer had given police could cause her husband to go to prison where he "would 
kill himself/7 (2) said that "if [Jennifer] loved him [she] wouldn't let something like 
this happen to him," (3) suggested that her daughter-in-law "needfed] to be 
imaginative" in offering a substitute for that account, and (4) offered Jennifer a 
hypothetical recantation story about Jennifer's having cut herself. See R145:15-18. A 
person of ordinary intelligence would understand that this conduct could violate 
the witness tampering statute. The statute gives adequate notice that a person 
violates the law where that person believes that an investigation is pending and 
attempts to induce or cause another person to inform falsely or withhold 
information. 
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Moreover, where a statute clearly sets forth what conduct is prohibited, the 
statute does not "authorize^ or even encourage[] arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement/' Hill, 530 U.S. at 733. Defendant's conduct in attempting to induce 
Jennifer to recant her story to police and in suggesting how Jennifer might explain 
her recantation "fell unmistakably within [witness-tampering] statute's purview, 
leaving no room for law enforcement officials to decide, in their discretion, that the 
statute's provisions should not apply." Green, 2004 UT 76, f 52. 
In sum, the statute was not vague as applied to Defendant. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S VERDICT 
Defendant next claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 
court's verdict. Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly credited Jennifer's 
testimony and improperly discredited Jeremiah's testimony. See Br. Appellant at 23-
24. She also asserts that the evidence did not "effectively eliminate as a possibility, 
defense counsel's assertion of the reasonable alternative hypothesis," and therefore 
was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24-26 (uppercase 
omitted). 
A. The trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility was 
supported by the evidence. 
"In assessing a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a trial 
court's verdict, [an appellate court] sustain[s] the trial court's judgment unless it is 
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against the clear weight of the evidence, or [unless the court] reach[es] a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made/' Briggs, 2008 UT 83, f 11 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). ''As the trier of fact in a bench trial, the trial 
court is in the best position to weigh conflicting evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses/' Pitt v. Taron, 2009 UT App 113, % 2 n.l, 210 P.3d 962. "On appeal from a 
bench trial, [f] hidings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses/7 Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, % 2, 54 P.3d 1119 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The trier-of-fact is "free to believe or disbelieve 
all or part of any witness's testimony/' State v. Stuffings, 2007 UT App 326U 
(quoting State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (addressing jury trials). "[A] reviewing court may not reassess 
credibility or reweigh evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of 
the [trier's] verdict." Id. (quoting State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1983) 
(also addressing jury trials)). 
Defendant's basic claim appears to be that both Jeremiah and Jennifer gave at 
least some statements that were untrue. See Br. Appellant at 23-24. Based on that, 
she argues that the trial court had no reason to credit Jennifer's trial testimony and 
to discredit Jeremiah's. See id. 
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Both Jennifer and Jeremiah did make pretrial statements that were 
inconsistent with their trial testimony, necessarily meaning that some portions of 
either the earlier statements or the trial testimony were false. At one point following 
the October assault, Jennifer told police that Defendant beat her, but that Jeremiah 
did not "hit [her] at all/7 See State's Exhibit 8. But at trial Jennifer testified that both 
Defendant and Jeremiah hit her. R145:67-69. Jeremiah told police that during the 
October incident Defendant, his mother, beat Jennifer. See State's Exhibit 7. He also 
told police that Defendant tried to get him to falsely say that he had not been there 
when the alleged assault occurred. See id. at 3. At trial, on the other hand, Jeremiah 
testified that, in fact, he had not been there and had only said that Defendant beat 
Jennifer because Jennifer told him that he "needed to back her up on this." 
R145:118. 
Thus, both Jennifer and Jeremiah gave false accounts at some point during the 
investigation or the trial. But that did not mean that the trial court had to disregard 
their testimony or the evidence of their pretrial statements. As explained, me trial 
court was free to "judge the credibility of the witnesses," Roderick, 2002 UT 84, Tf 2, 
and "to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony." Stalhngs, 2007 
UT App 326U (internal citation and quotations marks omitted). 
Here, the court apparently believed Jennifer's trial testimony, including her 
explanation that she had falsely recanted her first statement to police about the July 
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incident because Defendant told her that her statement might cause Jeremiah, her 
husband, to be sent to prison where he would kill himself. See R145:ll-12,19-20. 
The trial court apparently also believed Jennifer's testimony that the recantation was 
false and her testimony about Defendant and Jeremiah taking turns beating her up 
during the October assault. See R145:20, 66-67. On the other hand, the trial court 
apparently did not believe Jeremiah's trial testimony that he was not present when 
the October beating occurred. See R145:118-19. The trial court, when acting as a 
trier-of-fact, is "in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to 
derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). For 
instance, the trial court is in a position to assess the credibility and potential bias of 
the witnesses, based not only on their statements but also on their demeanor, 
including their apparent candor and/or evasiveness. Here, based on those matters, 
the trial court may reasonably have found that Defendant and Jeremiah appeared 
more evasive m giving their testimony and had greater motivation to lie at trial — to 
protect themselves and one another—than Jennifer did. 
In sum, Jennifer's testimony, as credited by the trial court, sufficed to establish 
that Defendant attempted to induce her to testify or inform falsely during the police 
investigation of the July beating and to establish that Defendant assaulted Jennifer 
during the October incident. Moreover, Jennifer's testimony was not "inherently 
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improbable/' "physically impossible/7 or "apparently false." See State v. Robbins, 
2009 UT 23, Tf 16, 210 P.3d 288. While her trial testimony was inconsistent with 
some statements to police, she explained both to police and at trial the reason she 
had attempted to falsely recant. See R145:20. That she made false statements to 
police about Jeremiah's involvement—under fear that her husband might commit 
suicide if jailed—does not make her trial testimony inherently improbable. See id. 
Rather, her false recantation was a rational, albeit improper, response to the 
emotional stress of that fear. 
B. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court, acting as 
trier-of-fact, found that the State had proved Defendant's guilt 
on both counts beyond a reasonable doubt; it did not also need 
to find that that the evidence precluded every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence. 
Defendant claims that the trial court "did not effectively eliminate as a 
possibility, defense counsel's assertion of the reasonable alternative hypothesis/' Br. 
Appellant at 24 (uppercase eliminated). She claims that the evidence supported a 
finding that Jeremiah, rather than Defendant assaulted Jennifer. See id. She asserts 
that the evidence was consequently insufficient to support the guilty verdicts. See 
id. at 24-27. Defendant's claim is without merit. 
Defendant's counsel presented the trier-of-f act with an arguably plausible 
defense theory, i.e., that Jeremiah, not Defendant, hit and injured Jennifer in the 
October incident. In so doing, counsel may have "craft[ed] a reasonable alternative 
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hypothesis supportive of [her] innocence/7 State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2, % 14,200 
P.3d 674. But, as explained repeatedly by this court, "presentation of such a 
hypothesis alone is not enough." Id. (citing State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278,281 (Utah 
App. 1998)). "'[T]he existence of one or more alternate reasonable alternative 
hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the [trier-of-fact] from concluding that [a] 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt/" Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 (quoting 
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah App. 1995)). "This is so because it is the 
exclusive province of [triers-of-fact] to weigh the competing theories of the case, in 
light of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and 
to conclude which one they believe." Buck, 2009 UT App 2, f 14 (citing Lyman, 966 
P.2d at 282). It is the job of the trier-of-fact to "weigh the evidence" supporting the 
various theories and "determine the credibility of the witnesses." Id. (citing Lyman, 
966P.2dat282). 
Where the court, acting as trier-of-fact in a bench trial, determines what 
witnesses it will believe, what weight it will give to the evidence supporting 
alternative theories, and finally what theories it will and will not believe, the 
appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision "unless it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence," or unless the appellate court "reach[es] a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Briggs, 2008 UT 83, Tf 11 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Defendant's "alternative reasonable hypothesis" depended solely on whether 
the trial court believed Jeremiah's and Defendant's testimony. The trial court here, 
however, believed Jennifer's testimony about the July incident, including her 
explanation that she attempted to recant her initial statement because Defendant 
persuaded her that the statement might lead to Jeremiah's return to prison where he 
would likely commit suicide. See R145:20. In so doing, the Court rejected 
Defendant's testimony. The trial also believed Jennifer's testimony about the 
October incident, including her testimony that Defendant and Jeremiah both took 
turns beating her, and in so doing rejected Jeremiah's and Defendant's testimony to 
the contrary. See R145:67-69. The trial court was in a position to judge the 
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. See Pitt, 2009 UT App 113, % 2 n.l. 
Moreover, Jennifer's testimony was supported by the testimony of other witnesses. 
See, e.g., R145:37-40 (testimony of Esther Pearson, who lived near the Larsen home 
where Jeremiah and Jennifer were staying in July, observed the July fight, and 
testified that "he was pushing her down on the ground/' "was on top of her," and 
"looked like he was trying to drag her into the house"); R14558 (testimony of 
Officer Vincent Cox, who saw Jennifer on the day of the July fight, looked for 
injuries on her body, and observed no cuts, but saw a fresh cut on her leg the 
following day); R145:101-09 (testimony of Lettie Thompson, who saw Jennifer in 
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October when she came into the Chevron store "crying" and "walking really 
funny," "like something would poke out of the side of her hip"). 
Thus, the trial court's finding that the believable evidence established 
Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not against the clear weight of the 
evidence. See R145:185-86. The trial court was not required to address the 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" standard. Nor was the trial court required to 
disprove the Defendant's theory, which was based only on testimony that the court 
found to be not believable. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT IS UNPRESERVED, INADEQUATELY BRIEFED, 
AND MOOT 
Defendant claims that the trial court's sentence, suspending Defendant's 
prison term, but requiring her to serve 30 days in jail—which could be served in 
five-day increments — constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Br. Appellant at 
28. lie claims that the court's requirement that, in connection with her jail time, she 
channel her prescriptions through one doctor and one pharmacy, forced her to face 
"a torture chamber with pain so excruciating" as to be "life threatening" and 
possible isolation that might make her jail cell "a chamber of horrors." Id. at 29. 
Defendant's claim is unpreserved, inadequately briefed, and moot. 
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Background. At sentencing, the prosecution argued that Defendant was not a 
good candidate for jail. See R146:31. The presentence investigation report (PSI) 
included a two-page list of the medications that Defendant was then using. See 
R103-04.4 Her medications included controlled substances that may have required 
the jail to isolate her from the general population. See Rl03-04; R146:31-31. The jail 
was not equipped to deal with the problems the medications presented in the ways 
that the prison, with its pill lines and monitored pill ingestion protocols, could 
provide. R146:34. 
Defendant asserted that she had to have the medications, that she could not 
"walk without the medications" she was then on. R146:35. 
The trial court, "realiz[ing] that [a jail sentence] create[d] a problem for the 
jail/' R146:39, nonetheless determined to suspend Defendant's prison term and 
impose a jail term. Id. The court required that, in lieu of the zero-to-five-year prison 
term, Defendant spend 36 months on probation and serve 30 days in jail, to be 
served in "5-day increments to be spread out over several weeks." R117-18; 
R146:37. The court ordered that Defendant "maintain one physician and one 
4
 The PSI in this case is included in the pleadings file, not in a separate 
envelope under seal. See Rl03-04. 
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pharmacy and report all prescriptions to AP&P within 24 hours of receipt"; not 
consume any alcohol, including NyQuil; and not possess or consume any illegal 
drugs. R146:38. The court also required that she bring her prescriptions to the jail in 
"the original prescription bottle." R146:41. 
The court then asked Defendant whether she would accept probation on these 
terms. R146:42. Defendant agreed that she would. Id. Neither Defendant nor 
defense counsel objected to the medical conditions placed on Defendant. Id. And 
neither objected to the sentence or argued that it constituted "cruel and unusual 
circumstances." Id. 
A. This claim is unpreserved. 
As explained, Defendant did not argue at sentencing that the trial court 
abused its discretion in sentencing her or that the conditions of her probation, 
including the requirements that she channel her prescriptions through one doctor 
and one pharmacy and bring her medications to the jail only in their original bottles, 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Nor did she areue that the possibility 
that she might face isolation in the jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
See R146:31-43. In fact, Defendant seemed to welcome her 30-day jail sentence as an 
alternative to a prison term of up to five years. See R146:42. Thus she did not 
preserve her claim below. Nor does she argue on appeal that the trial court plainly 
erred in imposing her sentence. Thus, this Court should not address her sentencing 
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claim. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11; Winfield, 2006 UT 4,114 (both addressing the 
requirement that a party articulate some appropriate justification for reviewing 
unpreserved claims). 
B. This claim is inadequately briefed. 
This Court should also decline to review Defendant's claim because it is 
inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
that a defendant's brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." As explained in Point IB, above, under that rule, a 
party must provide both pertinent authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority. 
But here, Defendant has not presented any precedent, much less meaningful 
analysis based on that precedent, to support her claim. Defendant cites only one 
case, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), to support her claim that the 
conditions of probation constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See Br. 
Appellant at 28-30, But Robinson does not treat probation or sentencing conditions. 
The Robinson court simply held that a state law which imprisons a person because 
he is a drug addict, i.e., for his status as an addict rather than his use of proscribed 
drugs, inflicts cruel and unusual punishment, even where the imprisonment is for 
only ninety days. See id. at 667. That case does not address the questions presented 
here. Because Defendant has failed to present any relevant authority to support her 
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claim, this Court should decline to find it for her. And because she has failed to 
present any meaningful analysis, this Court should decline to construct her 
arguments for her. 
C. This claim is moot 
In any event, Defendant's challenge to her sentence is moot. "An issue on 
appeal is considered moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights 
of the litigants." State v. Vicente, 2004 UT 6, % 3,84 P.3d 1191 (citing State v. Sims, 881 
P.2d 840,841 (Utah 1994)). Here, the record indicates that Defendant has completed 
her jail term. See R166. Defendant's requested judicial relief, i.e., that "the 
remaining jail time, restrictions on medical care and conditions of the probation 
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agreement relating thereto be stricken or modified/' cannot affect her rights. Br. 
Appellant at 28. Consequently, this issue is moot.5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
5
 Defendant's claim is also meritless. A trial court's sentencing decision is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8, 40 P.3d 626. 
Defendants face a particularly heavy burden when challenging a trial court's 
sentence. An appeals court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory 
or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant factors [,] 
or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, f 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, "the fact that [a defendant] views 
[her] situation differently than did the trial court does not prove that the trial court 
neglected to consider the [legally relevant] factors." Helms, 2002 UT 12, f^ 14. The 
decision to grant or deny probation "is within the complete discretion of the trial 
court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1049 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here, nothing suggests that the trial court failed to consider any legally 
relevant factor, imposed cruel and unusual punishment, imposed an inherently 
unfair sentence, or abused its discretion when it suspended Defendant's prison 
term, imposed a 30-day jail term, and charted a course that permitted Defendant to 
receive her prescribed medications in jail while also accommodating the jail's 
security concerns. 
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A d d e n d 11111 
76-5-102. Assault, 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the 
pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious 
bodily injury to another. 
Amended by Chapter 109, 2003 General Session 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Receiving or soliciting a bribe. 
(1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with a 
witness if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending 
or about to be instituted, or with the intent to prevent an official 
proceeding or investigation, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause 
another person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item, 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has 
been summoned, 
(2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or receiving 
a bribe as a witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in 
consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1). 
(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a 
bribe under this section does not merge with any other substantive offense 
committed in the course of committing any offense under this section 
Amended by Chapter 140, 2004 i Ivmn ai Session 
